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This paper has three parts. The first uses quantile regression to show that the 
correlation between hedge fund strategies increases in times of stress. The second shows 
that this behavior is mostly due to a common measurable shock. Finally, the paper tries to 
asses whether hedge funds which focus on hedging away from common measurable 
shocks increase their size. 
To treat the three contributions in turn, the dependence of hedge funds on other 
funds is shown to increase during times of stress through the comparison of two sets of 
quantile regressions, measured at the 50% and 5% levels. Indeed, this approach turns the 
previous approach of two of the authors on its head.  Whereas before they use quantile 
regression to assess VAR’s to investigate systemic risk, here they focus on the quantil 
regression itself and leave systemic risk contributions unsaid.  The authors find, in table 
2, that the hedge funds increase their dependence by 45%, on average. In the single 
example where being in a tail event decreased the dependence of a hedge fund on other 
funds, the dependence became less negative, making it less of a hedge against the 
direction of the other funds’ exposure.   So tail events increase the tendency of hedge 
funds to move together, a finding that is interesting and important for research into 
contagion. However, the table also indicates considerable heterogeneity in this overall 
result.  What are we to make of this?  I would have liked to have know what distinguishes 
this finding from earlier research by Boyson, Stahel, and Stulz (2006) (which they cite) 
and others, such as Brown and Spitzer (2006) who have found the same phenomenon. 
Does the use of quantile methods make this a more reliable finding?  What are 
differences in quantile methods that distinguish these findings from ones given by copula 
correlations or even simple event studies? Given that so much recent research has 
focused on the properties of porfolios during tail events, a useful contribution would 
focus on the features of the quantile approach that make it an advantageous one.  (This 
has been done in the statistical literature by Koenker (2005), which is cited in the paper.  
It would be nice to see something said about the properties in this paper.)  
The second contribution is to investigate whether this phenomenon is affected 
when they use residual returns after taking into account seven risk factors, including 
excess market return, volatility measures, liquidity risk measures, and yield slopes.  
These are common factors that are all measurable, and they could be used by managers to 
“offload” their portfolio into investments that are less sensitive to these factors. Once the 
offloadings are removed from the hedge fund returns, the 5% quantile regressions are run 
on the residuals with the result that the much of the 5% sensitivity is accounted for by 
these factors. Presumably the factors should also account for the difference between the 
median sensitivity and the tail sensitivity as well which it does. I would very much have 
liked a comparison of these results with similar earlier results such as Boyson, Stahel, and 
Stulz (2006), along with a discussion of where these results differ and why. Further, it is 
quite clear from the tables that some funds are much more sensitive to these common 
factors than others, and are much more sensitive to each other than others.  What 
accounts for this?  These hedge funds are actually just aggregates chosen by Credit Suisse 
to represent differing strategies.  To what extent are the strategies consistent with an 
“offloading” strategy in a tail event? The final contribution concerns an observation often made anecdotally about 
hedge fund managers: these managers have no incentive to offload tail risk. The results 
from a regression shows when the tail risk decreases, inflow into that strategy also 
decreases, suggesting that managerial incentives are not to offload tail risk because this 
will reduce their management fees. This was a tantalizing result.  However it raised many 
questions, some of which could have been explored with the data and methods used here.  
To what extent can a strategy offload risk due to common measurable factors?  Do 
shocks in these dimensions allow such a strategy to work, or do these shocks arise so 
quickly that they cannot respond?  How do the possible methods of hedging against a 
common shock relate to the measure defined, and then left undescribed in this paper to 
measure hedge fund flows?  And what does this measure have to do with systemic risk? 
There was so much I wanted to know about this result, but the brevity of the description 
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